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Abstract
In this paper we investigate tax/subsidy competition for FDI between countries of diﬀerent
size when a domestic ﬁrm is the incumbent in the largest market. We investigate how the
nature (public or private) of the incumbent ﬁrm aﬀects policy competition between the
two governments seeking to attract FDI. We show that the country hosting the incumbent
always beneﬁts from FDI if the domestic ﬁrm is a public welfare-maximizing ﬁrm, while
its welfare may decrease when it is a private ﬁrm, as already shown by Bjorvatn and
Eckel (2006). We also show that, contrary to the case of a private domestic incumbent,
a public ﬁrm acts as a disciplinary device for the foreign multinational that will always
choose the eﬃcient welfare-maximizer location. Finally, an eﬃciency-enhancing role of
policy competition may only arise when the domestic incumbent is a private ﬁrm, while
tax competition is always wasteful when the incumbent is a public ﬁrm.
Keywords: Foreign Direct Investment; Tax/subsidy competition; Public ﬁrm; Interna-
tional mixed oligopoly
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One of the most well documented trends in the world economy over the last two decades
has been the rise in foreign direct investments (FDI) by multinational enterprises (MNEs).
At an aggregate level, the empirical evidence indicates that FDI grew rapidly in the last 15
years of the 20th century, far outpacing the growth of international trade among industrialized
countries.1 Moreover, because of the widely held advantages of receiving FDI (e.g., cheaper or
higher-quality goods for domestic consumers, technological spillovers to domestic producers,
job creation, etc.), an increasing number of national governments oﬀers MNEs countervailing
incentives to attract their investments and competition mostly takes place at an intra-regional
level, i.e., between countries belonging to the same economic area (e.g., Latin America, South-
East Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, and so on).2 In spite of that, FDI can be an issue
to the extent that foreign investors often operate in the same sector as some incumbent
local ﬁrm, which is, in some cases, a public state-owned enterprise. In some industries, the
relative importance of state-owned enterprises is even expanding in recent years also (but not
only) because of the global ﬁnancial crisis that has prompted many governments worldwide
to increase their stakes in private corporations. In the oil industry, state-owned companies
such as Saudi Aramco, Gazprom (Russia), China National Petroleum Corp., National Iranian
Oil Co., Petrleos de Venezuela, Petrobras (Brazil) and Petronas (Malaysia), now control more
than 75% of all crude oil production.3 Since national oil companies generally hold exclusive
rights to exploration and development of petroleum resources within the home country, they
can also decide on the degree to which they require participation by private companies in
those activities. This might negatively aﬀect the investment decisions of foreign MNEs as it
was the case in Venezuela in June 2007, when ExxonMobil Corporation and ConocoPhillips,
two of the largest U.S. oil companies, abandoned their multi-billion dollar investments in the
heavy oil deposits of the Orinoco basin.
In the automotive sector, state-owned and state-controlled companies play a major role in
many developed and emerging countries markets: in China, for instance, two of the largest
carmakers (Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation and First Automobile Works) are
state-owned enterprises and at the same time partner companies of the Volkswagen Group.
The telecommunications industry also provides several examples of FDI in the presence of
a state-owned incumbent.4 In 1996 the U.S. company Mediaone invested in Telnet, a cable and
ﬁxed-line operator in Belgium competing against the government-owned incumbent Belgacom.
Today, Telnet is controlled by the U.S. company MediaOne and has achieved a share of about
15% of a market where the public ﬁrm Belgacom retains the largest market share.5 In 1993,
the US Company Bell South launched its mobile phone network in New Zealand to compete
1See, e.g., Markusen (1995), Markusen and Venables (1998), and Barba Navaretti et al. (2004).
2For an overview of this issue, see Oman (2001).
3The Wall Street Journal (2010).
4See OECD (2011) for a full account of the presence of state-owned incumbents in OECD Telecommunica-
tions markets, their market shares and new entrant market shares.
5Source: Telnet corporate website (2011)
1against the state-owned incumbent Telecom NZ. In 1998 the company was bought by the
British Vodafone that now is the largest mobile operator in the country. Another example is
Slovenia were in 1999 the joint venture Sl.mobil including the Swedish company Telia entered
the mobile TLC market as direct competitor for the state-owned incumbent Mobitel. In 2001
the Austrian MobilKom became the largest shareholder and in 2003 a partnership agreement
was signed with Vodaphone.6
At the same time, state-owned companies are becoming international players with opera-
tions that spread outside national boundaries. For example, Norways state-owned oil company
Statoil operates not only in the Norwegian continental shelf (where it faces the competition
of two MNEs, Esso Norge and Norske Shell), but also in West Africa, the Gulf of Mexico, and
oﬀ the coast of Brazil, it owns two reﬁneries (one in Norway and one in Denmark) and its
gasoline retail activities span across Scandinavia and the Baltic States.7
We believe that is therefore interesting to analyze the impact of FDI taking into account
its potentially negative consequences on the proﬁtability of a local incumbent. These conse-
quences might be diﬀerent depending on the nature of the local ﬁrm, private or government-
owned. Our theoretical framework builds on the literature about policy competition for FDI.
Namely, on those contributions considering imperfect product market competition, country-
size asymmetry, and intra-regional trade costs. This strand of the literature grows out of the
paper by Hauﬂer and Wooton (1999)(henceforth H&W), which analyzes competition between
two countries of unequal size trying to attract a foreign-owned monopolist.8 Both countries
are willing to oﬀer a subsidy to the ﬁrm but, in equilibrium, the large country wins the com-
petition for FDI since the ﬁrm prefers locating in the big market in order to save on trade
costs. Moreover, if the market-size diﬀerence is large enough, the large country may be able
to levy a positive lump-sum tax on the foreign ﬁrm’s proﬁt. Ferrett and Wooton (2010) ex-
tend H&W’s model to study policy competition for FDI by two ﬁrms from the same industry
producing homogeneous goods in either of the two countries. A general conclusion stemming
from this paper is that tax competition under duopoly does not create a “race to the bottom”
in corporate tax rates since ﬁrms are always taxed in equilibrium. Hauﬂer and Wooton (2006)
develop a three-country model of competition for FDI between a union of two countries and
a third potential-host country. Countries’ willingness to attract the foreign ﬁrm stems from
trade costs’ saving, which are lower within the union than between the union and the outside
country. In such a scenario, coordination of regional tax/subsidy policies at the union level is
6Hrovatin et al. (2004).
7See Flores-Macias and Musacchio (2009).
8A diﬀerent set of papers looks at two-country policy competition by incorporating positive (or negative)
spillovers from FDI. The presence of potential beneﬁts from the investment – due to the existence of, e.g.,
regional unemployment, vertical industry linkages with domestic producers and agglomeration eﬀects, tech-
nological spillovers, etc. – induces countries to a subsidy competition to attract the foreign MNE. See, for
instance, Black and Hoyt (1989), Haaparanta (1996), Haaland and Wooton (1999), Barros and Cabral (2000),
and Fumagalli (2003). By contrast, when the location of a foreign ﬁrm causes negative externalities for the
host country (e.g. by polluting its environment), policy competition may result in excessively high tax rates.
See Markusen, Morey and Olewiler (1995).
2shown to bring about welfare gains to the union countries.
The issues we are interested in are also related to the theoretical literature on mixed
oligopoly. The latter has generally focused on the optimal strategies of the public ﬁrm, the
characterization of market equilibria and the eﬀects of privatization by adapting the standard
models of oligopolistic competition to the welfare-maximizing behavior of public ﬁrms.9 More
recently, closer attention has been paid to international mixed oligopoly given that the public
ﬁrm’s behavior is sensitive to the nationality of its private competitor (Fjell and Pal, 1996; Fjell
and Heywood, 2002). In particular, some work has been devoted to the analysis of instruments,
such as production subsidies, that are alternative to direct public provision (Pal and White,
1998; Sepahvand, 2004); to the study of partial privatization and optimum tariﬀs (Chao and
Yu, 2006); or to make the timing of competition endogenous (Cornes and Sepahvand, 2003;
Matsumura, 2003). Other contributions (Norb¨ ack and Persson, 2004; 2005) have studied
competition between foreign and domestic private ﬁrms as potential buyers of state-owned
assets which are sold at an auction during the privatization process.
In this paper, we apply the analysis of international mixed oligopoly to a context where two
active governments seek to attract FDI by a foreign ﬁrm from a third country. In our model
we follow Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006) that modify H&W’s set-up by introducing a domestic
ﬁrm - in the big country - which competes with the foreign investor on the regional market. As
a consequence, the FDI decision is driven by a trade-oﬀ between the advantage of locating in
the big market (market size eﬀect) and the beneﬁt of being a monopolist in the small market
(competition eﬀect). The intensity of policy competition and the resulting equilibrium policy
(i.e., a subsidy or a tax) depend on the relative location advantages oﬀered by the two countries.
An interesting result in their model is that the country hosting the incumbent ﬁrm does not
always gain from the investment of the MNE. The beneﬁt for consumers may be in fact oﬀset
by the shift of proﬁt from the domestic incumbent to the foreign ﬁrm. Another important
contribution of their paper concerns the evaluation of tax/subsidy competition to attract FDI.
Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006) show that the introduction of policy competition may improve the
eﬃciency of the location choice of the MNE. The reason is that imperfect competition distorts
the FDI choice of the foreign ﬁrm so that the proﬁt-maximizing location may not coincide
with the eﬃcient (i.e, aggregate welfare maximizer) location. Introducing policy competition
between the government of the two countries has the eﬀect of internalizing the external eﬀect
of the location choice in the MNE’s decision which therefore becomes eﬃcient. This eﬃciency-
enhancing property of tax competition is also highlighted by Fumagalli (2003) in the presence
of positive technological spillovers from the investment and by Barros and Cabral (2000) when
countries diﬀer in unemployment levels. Additionally, policy competition may even enhance
regional welfare when the gains from a more eﬃcient location choice of the MNE more than
compensate the subsidy paid and there is potential for Pareto improvement via side payment.
The main contribution of our paper is to show that these positive eﬀects of the introduc-
tion of policy competition crucially depend on the nature (public or private) of the domestic
9See Rees (1984), B¨ os (1986), de Fraja and Delbono (1989), and Beato and Mas-Colell (1984).
3incumbent ﬁrm. We show that the eﬃciency enhancing feature of policy competition does not
hold when the incumbent is a welfare-maximizer public ﬁrm. The reason is that the public
ﬁrm acts as a disciplinary device leading the foreign MNE to the eﬃcient location choice.10
Therefore the introduction of policy competition does not change the location choice of the
MNE and, in the presence of transaction costs, it becomes ineﬃcient. Furthermore it may also
result in a waste of resources for the region when the two countries actively compete to attract
FDI.11 Finally, contrary to the result in Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006), the country hosting the
incumbent ﬁrm always beneﬁts from the FDI when the incumbent is public and is therefore
always willing to oﬀer a subsidy to attract the investment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we analyze the investment
decision of a foreign MNE when the incumbent in the big country is a welfare-maximizing
public ﬁrm and provide the main results of the model. In Section 3 we discuss the impact of
the nature – public or private – of the domestic incumbent, while in Section 4 we generalize the
result obtained in a simple linear model. In Section 5, we discuss the robustness of our results
to some speciﬁc issues and, ﬁnally, Section 6 summarizes the main conclusions emerging from
our work.
2 FDI decision in the presence of a public ﬁrm
In this Section, we illustrate the model we use to analyze the impact of policy competition
between countries on the investment decision of a multinational ﬁrm when the incumbent in
the big market is a welfare-maximizing public ﬁrm and the ﬁnal good is traded within the
region.
An example of such competition occurred in 1997 between UK and France for the biggest
Japanese investment in Europe in a decade proposed by the carmaker Toyota. French mar-
ket was characterized by the presence of the government-controlled incumbent Renault that
commanded the largest share in the domestic market. Under the European rules to date,
countries could have oﬀered subsidies up to a third of the total investment of $1.6 billion,
even though Toyota oﬃcials in London insisted that the government aid oﬀered to lure inward
investment would have played only a small part is such decisions.12 In December 1997 Toyota,
announced that it had chosen the northern French town of Valenciennes as the site for its
new car assembly plant. The French Government agreed to provide around 10% of the initial
investment and [t]his was a key factor in the Japanese manufacturer’s choice of location for
its new factory. (EIROnline - European Industrial Relation Observatory on-line, 1997).
In the theoretical model proposed, we represent such policy competition by a three-stage
10The disciplinary role of a public ﬁrm in imperfectly competitive markets as already been highlighted in the
literature on mixed oligopolies; see for example Anderson et al. (1997).
11If the location advantage of one of the countries is very large that policy competition becomes an additional
tax instrument on the foreign ﬁrm. However in such a case it would be diﬃcult to describe the situation as one
of “competition” to attract the investment.
12The Economist (1997).
4game characterized by the following sequence of decisions:
• In stage 1, the governments of the two countries simultaneously and irreversibly post
bids – lump-sum taxes/subsidies – to attract the foreign investor.
• In stage 2, the foreign multinational decides in which country to locate its production
plant to serve the regional markets.
• In stage 3, the foreing multinational and the incumbent public ﬁrm compete ` a la Cournot
in the regional markets and payoﬀs (proﬁts and welfare) are realised.
We solve our three-stage game by backward induction to ﬁnd its subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium in pure strategies.
2.1 The basic set-up
We develop a model in which a ﬁrm from a third-country (we will refer to it as ﬁrm 1, the
MNE or the foreign ﬁrm) has to decide in which of two countries to invest in order to provide
some ﬁnal good to the consumers of the whole region.
The markets of the two countries are of unequal size. Namely, in line with Hauﬂer and
Wooton (1999), we assume that there is a single consumer in country A and n ≥ 1 identical
consumers in country B. Hence, when n > 1, country B represents the “big” market for
the ﬁnal good. Consumers’ preferences are such that each of them has linear demand for the
commodity, Q = α − p. So, in country A the two ﬁrms face the total demand QA = α − pA
and in country B the total demand QB = n(α − pB). The two inverse demands are therefore:
pA (QA) = α − QA pB (QB) = α −
QB
n
Prior to entry of the MNE in the region, no production takes place in the small country,
whereas the big country already hosts a welfare-maximizing public ﬁrm (ﬁrm 0).13 The latter
sells the same product as the MNE but it is less eﬃcient than the former, i.e., it produces
the ﬁnal good at a higher marginal cost, c0 > c1 ≥ 0, with ci denoting the constant marginal
production cost of ﬁrm i = 0,1. To make the analysis simpler, we assume that the public
incumbent cannot serve the other market in the region; this assumption will be relaxed later
on.
The MNE has to incur a ﬁxed cost F > 0 to establish a production plant in either country
since trade costs associated with exporting from its residence country to the region are assumed
to be prohibitively high compared to trade costs within the region (τ).14 As an example, we
13We do not exclude from the outset the symmetric-country case, which simply requires n = 1. However, we
do not consider the case where the public ﬁrm operates in the small country, which is equivalent to n < 1. As
it will become evident below, this leads to the trivial conclusion that the MNE always prefers to invest in the
biggest country with no local competitor.
14In what follows, we assume that the ﬁxed cost F is symmetric across countries and so high that it will never
be proﬁtable for the MNE to pay it twice but not so high to make FDI in the favorite country unproﬁtable.
5can think of a German multinational which has to pick one location between Argentina and
Chile where to build a production plant with the purpose of servicing the consumers of this
Latin American region.
The marginal cost of serving a market depends on the eﬃciency of the ﬁrm, and on the
location of ﬁrms and consumers. When the ﬁnal good is produced and sold locally, the
marginal cost for the ﬁrm is equal to ci, i = 0,1; by contrast, when the ﬁrm exports the ﬁnal
good to the other country, the marginal cost is higher since it also includes some intra-regional
trade costs, τ > 0. The latter separates the two markets so that consumer prices for the same
ﬁnal good will be diﬀerent in the two countries.15 But since the two ﬁrms sell a homogeneous
good, its consumer price in a given market, in equilibrium, will be the same irrespective of
where production takes place.16
If we denote by qij the quantity of the ﬁnal good sold by ﬁrm i on country j’s market so
that q0j + q1j = Qj, (j = A,B), we can write total cost functions of ﬁrms 0 and 1 as follows:
C0 (q0A,q0B) = c0 (q0A + q0B) + τq0A
C1 (q1A,q1B) = F + c1 (q1A + q1B) + τ (IAq1A + IBq1B)
where Ij = 0 if FDI goes to j and Ij = 1 otherwise.
Production and trade costs are assumed not to exceed the consumers’ maximal willingness
to pay, i.e., c0,c1,τ ≤ α. In addition, to keep our analysis as simple as possible, we normalize
ﬁrm 1’s marginal production cost to 0 (c1 = 0) and set α = 1, so that c0,τ ∈ [0,1].
The objective of the public ﬁrm is to maximize social welfare in B, WB (q0A,q0B,q1A,q1B),
which corresponds to the sum of consumer surplus and ﬁrm 0’s proﬁts
Z QB
0
pB(s)ds − pB(QB)(q0B + q1B)
| {z }
CSB(QB)






pB(s)ds − pB(QB)q1B + pA(QA)q0A − C0 (q0A,q0B) (1)
from which it is evident that WB increases with the overall quantity sold on the domestic
market - due to the lower consumer price - and decreases with the revenues the MNE collects
by serving the big market.
The foreign ﬁrm is instead interested in maximizing proﬁts whose amount depends on
where it locates its production plant:17
Πj
1 (q0A,q0B,q1A,q1B) = pA (QA)q1A + pB (QB)q1B − C1 (q1A,q1B), j = A,B (2)
15Several empirical studies show that the market segmentation assumption is consistent with the price-setting
behavior of ﬁrms even within the European Union, where, in principle, there should be no oﬃcial barriers to
cross-border trade. See, for instance, Head and Mayer (2000), Haskel and Wolf (2001), and Lutz (2004).
16In this respect, our model is very similar to the “reciprocal dumping” model of Brander and Krugman
(1983) whose focus is, however, on the welfare eﬀects of trade.
17Throughout the paper, the superscript indicates the country where the MNE invests. In what follows, we
will drop the subscript 1 from the expression denoting the MNE’s proﬁts in order to ease the notation.
6Since the dynamic game is solved by backward induction, in what follows we analyse each
stage of the game starting from market competition in stage three.
2.2 Market competition
Suppose that governments have deﬁned in the ﬁrst stage of the game the lump-sum taxes
or subsidies to oﬀer to the MNE and, in the second stage, the latter has decided in which
country to locate. In the last stage of the game the MNE and the public incumbent compete ` a
la Cournot on the two markets of country A and B.18 Under the lump-sum assumption taxes
or subsidies do not aﬀect ﬁrms’ quantity decisions and can be disregarded. Then, the public
ﬁrm’s reaction function is given by:
q0B = n(1 − c0)
and we assume for the time being that q0A = 0. We must stress here that the public ﬁrm’s
output choice for its domestic market is independent of the MNE’s behaviour; that is, it always
produces the same quantity.19 The consequence of this output strategy is that the public ﬁrm
runs losses or at most breaks even. Indeed, in the absence of any rival, it behaves as a public
monopoly and follows the usual marginal-cost pricing rule, which leads to zero proﬁts. But
when the MNE supplies a positive quantity, total output increases and the price decreases
below the public ﬁrm’s marginal cost. If the public ﬁrm may earn negative overall proﬁts, we
postulate that lump-sum transfers from country B’s residents occur in order to balance the
ﬁrm’s deﬁcit.20















It is to be noted that the linearity of costs allows the MNE to choose the quantity produced
for, say, the market of country A independently of that produced for the market of country
B. Straightforward computations yield equilibrium quantities for the two ﬁrms.
On the one hand, if the MNE invests in the big country (superscript B), we obtain:
qB











18We get qualitatively similar results by allowing for endogenous timing in the order of moves by ﬁrms.
Relying on Cournot competition to illustrate our conclusions is a way to facilitate the exposition.
19This is so because the marginal beneﬁt (hence, the optimal choice) of public ﬁrm’s production does not
change with the quantity supplied by the MNE on that market. The welfare-maximizing output choice of the
public ﬁrm is such that its marginal beneﬁt equals its marginal cost, i.e., pB (QB)−p
′
B (QB)q1B = C
′
0 (q0A,q0B).
The eﬀect of a change in the MNE’s output, q1B, on the marginal beneﬁt is given by p
′





B (QB)q1B which is nil since p
′′
B (·) = 0 if demand is linear.
20In Section 5, we discuss the eﬀects of imposing a budget balance requirement on the public ﬁrm.
7On the other hand, if the MNE invests in the small country, we have:
qA















By locating in A, the MNE has to incur trade costs to service country B’s consumers. Hence,
exporting is going to be a viable option to the MNE as long as the cost of supplying the ﬁnal
good to the big country’s market does not exceed the production cost of the local public ﬁrm.
2.3 Investment decision of the MNE
The governments of the two countries compete to attract FDI by the foreign ﬁrm. In particular,
they can either tax or subsidize both local consumers and the MNE in a lump-sum fashion.
The results we present in this Section are derived in the absence of policy competition or,
similarly, for a situation where the two countries use identical tax/subsidy policies to induce
the MNE to invest within their borders.
In order to pick the best location for the investment, the MNE compares its operating
proﬁts from FDI in country A or in country B. Namely, it invests in, say, A as long as
ΠA > ΠB. When the latter holds with equality, the MNE is indiﬀerent between investing in






















When the two countries have the same market size (n = 1), the presence of a public ﬁrm –
although less eﬃcient than the MNE – is a strong disincentive to invest in B.non si vede da
sopra!! Intuitively, as there exist positive trade costs separating the two markets, the MNE
prefers to locate as distant as possible from its competitor. Hence, it will always invest in A.
In general, however, the investment decision of the MNE is driven by a “market size”, a
“cost”, and a “competition” eﬀect. The market size eﬀect is such that, as we let n increase,
the relative proﬁtability of investing in the big country increases and investment is more likely
to take place there. The cost eﬀect reﬂects the eﬃciency of the incumbent ﬁrm in country
B: intuition suggests that the higher c0, the higher the attractiveness of country B since the
MNE faces a weaker competitor on the big market. Finally, higher trade costs τ increase
the relative proﬁtability of investing in the small country because the more separated are the
markets the more proﬁtable is to be as far as possible from the local competitor.21
21The latter eﬀect is also shown by Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006) to hold when a private domestic incumbent is
considered.
8From equations (4), (5), and (6) it is possible to identify the threshold value τ⋆ (c0,n) such
that the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between investing in country A and B:
τ⋆ (c0,n) = 1 −
q
1 − nc2







if c0 > τ
Figure 1 depicts the threshold value τ⋆ in the space {τ,n} for diﬀerent values of c0. When
τ > τ⋆ the MNE invests in the small country A. Moreover, as it is clear from the graph
∂τ⋆
∂n > 0 and ∂τ⋆
∂c0
> 0. There is therefore a clear trade-oﬀ between the competition eﬀect that
works against the big country B and the eﬀects of cost and market size that increase the
attractiveness of country B.
Τ Hc0', nL Τ Hc0'', nL
Country A wins
Country B wins
         





Figure 1: Location choice of the multinational ﬁrm absent policy competition.
When τ > τ⋆(.) the MNE locates in the small country A. Since c′
0 > c′′
0 the picture
shows that the more eﬃcient the public incumbent is, the more attractive the small country
A becomes as the location for the multinational ﬁrm.
2.4 Policy competition for FDI
We now investigate how the introduction of tax/subsidy competition between the two countries
can aﬀect the investment decision of the MNE. We assume that the country receiving FDI
can levy a lump-sum tax on the foreign ﬁrm’s proﬁts or has to oﬀer a lump-sum subsidy in
9order to induce it to establish a production plant within its frontiers. We denote country j’s
tax/subsidy by Sj, j = A,B.
We ﬁrst need to identify the maximum subsidy each country is willing to oﬀer to the MNE.




for j,k = A,B, j  = k, with Wk
j denoting country j’s welfare when FDI goes to country k.
While welfare in country B consists of consumer surplus and public ﬁrm’s proﬁts as given by
equation (1), welfare in country A simply coincides with consumer surplus as no local ﬁrm
operates there prior to the MNE’s entry on the regional market. Evidently, country A always
beneﬁts from FDI as consumer surplus is higher by having the ﬁnal good produced and sold
locally instead of being served through exports. As for country B, we easily show that the





















if c0 ≤ τ
n
8



















k, ∀j,k = A,B, j  = k. This allows us to state
Proposition 1 In the presence of a welfare-maximizing public ﬁrm, both countries always
beneﬁt from the investment of the multinational.
The intuition for the result in Proposition 1 is the following. Since the public ﬁrm always
produces the same quantity, the MNE acts as a monopolist on the (constant) residual demand.
Therefore there is no crowding out of domestic production and consumers beneﬁt from a more
eﬃcient additional producer if FDI occurs in their own country.
As each country is better oﬀ by receiving FDI, both of them are willing to oﬀer a positive
subsidy to the MNE, which will invest in country j if and only if
Πj + Smax
j > Πk + Smax
k , for j,k = A,B, j  = k (7)
i.e., when proﬁts from locating in j – inclusive of the lump-sum subsidy country j oﬀers –
exceed those – subsidy inclusive – from investing in k.
When we evaluate whether and how tax/subsidy competition aﬀects the MNE’s investment
decision the following result holds.
Proposition 2 Tax/subsidy competition between countries does not change the investment
decision of the multinational.
10Such an irrelevance result rests on the absence of strategic interaction on both markets
which is essentially due to the linearity assumptions in the model and on the fact that the
public incumbent does not react to changes in the output of the rival ﬁrm; i.e., its reaction
function is ﬂat. The MNE, indeed, enjoys monopoly power on the small market, whereas the
public ﬁrm always produces the same quantity for the big market, where the MNE serves as a
monopolist the constant residual demand. When the MNE is indiﬀerent between investing in A
or in B, the gain in local proﬁts on A’s market from locating in A over B exactly compensates
the gain in local proﬁts on B’s market from locating in B over A. In addition, each country’s
welfare gain of receiving the investment is a ﬁxed proportion of the local proﬁt gain for the
MNE. Therefore, when local proﬁt gains are equal, the same holds for welfare gains, and since
welfare gains represent the maximum subsidy each country is willing to oﬀer to attract FDI,
the introduction of tax/subsidy competition does not modify the MNE’s investment decision.
From Proposition 2, it immediately follows
Corollary 1 In the presence of a welfare-maximizing public ﬁrm, policy competition to attract
FDI is wasteful for the region.
This result has to be qualiﬁed since it holds only when the location advantage of the receiving
country is not too large and therefore a subsidy is paid to the MNE.22 In general, although
one country’s welfare is higher when the MNE locates within its borders, policy competition
turns out to be just a waste of resources for the region as a whole since it does not change the
investment decision of the foreign ﬁrm and the host country has to grant the ﬁrm a subsidy
to win the competition for FDI.
If we are interested in the aggregate welfare, deﬁned as the sum of the regional welfare (the
welfare of two countries) and the MNE’s proﬁts, it is interesting to notice that the investment
decision of the MNE with policy competition maximizes aggregate welfare. In fact, condition












k > Πk + Wk
j + Wk
k , for j,k = A,B, j  = k
In addition, since policy competition does not aﬀect the investment decision of the MNE,
as shown by Proposition 2, we can state the following result:
Corollary 2 In the presence of a welfare-maximizing public ﬁrm the investment decision of
the MNE absent tax/subsidy competition is eﬃcienct and maximizes aggregate welfare.
2.5 Equilibrium policy
Because of diﬀerent market size, cost-asymmetry, and the presence of positive costs for intra-
regional trade, the MNE may prefer to invest in a country where part of its proﬁts are taxed
22If the location advantage is large there is no real competition between the countries and policy competition
becomes in fact an additional instrument to tax the foreign MNE.
11away in spite of the fact that the other country oﬀers a subsidy. In particular, provided that
country k sets its maximum subsidy, country j receives FDI by setting a positive lump-sum
tax on the MNE’s proﬁts if and only if the following condition holds:
Πj − Tj > Πk + Smax
k , for j,k = A,B, j  = k (8)
If this is the case, the subsidy country k is able to oﬀer to the MNE cannot oﬀset its dis-
advantage relative to country j. For instance, country B attracts the MNE by taxing its
proﬁts when its market is large enough compared to country A’s and the public ﬁrm is very
ineﬃcient. When the public ﬁrm instead represents a ﬁerce competitor for the big market,
country A receives FDI even if it taxes away part of the MNE’s proﬁts.
The equilibrium policy (subsidy or tax) is the result of an auction where the country
making the most attractive oﬀer receives the investment by the MNE.23 When both countries
oﬀer the maximum subsidy to attract FDI, country j wins the auction if condition (7) holds;
however, country j needs not actually to pay the maximum subsidy it is willing to oﬀer but
just the one which is necessary to out-bid the rival country, which is given by:
S∗
j ≡ Πk + Smax
k − Πj > 0, for j,k = A,B, j  = k
By contrast, when country j represents the most attractive location for FDI without
oﬀering any subsidy and despite the fact that country k oﬀers its maximum aﬀordable subsidy,
condition (8) holds. In this case, country j wins the auction by taxing away part of the MNE’s
proﬁts and the equilibrium lump-sum tax is given by:24
T∗





> 0, for j,k = A,B, j  = k
Figure 2 depicts the equilibrium policy resulting from competition in lump-sum taxes/subsidies
to attract FDI. The ﬁgure depicts the spaces of parameters {n,τ} where countries A or B
win the race by taxing or subsidizing the ﬁrm. Evidently, the introduction of such a policy
instrument can leave a country better oﬀ to the extent that the latter can extract part of the
foreign ﬁrm’s proﬁts. By contrast, if a country has to pay a subsidy to attract the MNE,
which would have invested there anyway absent tax competition, only the MNE will be better
oﬀ.25
3 The impact of the nature of the domestic incumbent
The result in Proposition 1 crucially depends on the nature of the incumbent ﬁrm: if it is
a public ﬁrm, the country hosting it would always beneﬁt from the additional investment of
23See the Appendix for a formal proof. The simultaneous auction equilibrium outcome is equivalent to
the equilibrium of a policy competition game where the two governments of the two countries post bids ` a la
Bertrand.
24In such a situation, i.e., when the relative advantage for the foreign ﬁrm of investing in country j is so large
that country k can never succeed in attracting FDI, we can regard the lump-sum tax as an entrance fee that
country j charges the ﬁrm for establishing its production plant there.

















Figure 2: FDI decision with tax/subsidy competition
a multinational enterprise. This result contrasts with the one by Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006)
according to which the big country “beneﬁts [from FDI] if trade costs and the size of its market
are not too large” (Lemma 2, p. 1897). Their theoretical framework diﬀers from ours in that
the big country hosts a private incumbent ﬁrm. When trade costs are suﬃciently high, the
local private ﬁrm prefers keeping the MNE as far as possible and the big country does not
beneﬁt from receiving FDI as the gain in consumer surplus would not compensate for the loss
in the local ﬁrm’s proﬁts.26
The nature of the incumbent ﬁrm is also relevant for the eﬃciency of MNE’s location
choice, i.e., the eﬀect on aggregate surplus or welfare. Our result in Corollary 2 shows that
absent policy competition the investment choice of the MNE is eﬃcient. However this is only
true when the incumbent is a public ﬁrm while it does not hold with a private incumbent,
as shown by Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006). In the latter case, in fact, imperfect competition
between private ﬁrms may distort the choice of the MNE resulting in an ineﬃcient location of
the investoment from the aggregate surplus perspective. The presence of a public ﬁrm, instead,
acts as a disciplinary device leading the foreign MNE to the eﬃcient location choice. Given
the eﬃciency result in Corollary 2, policy competition cannot increase the aggregate welfare
in the framework of our paper and any change in the resource allocation is just a transfer
26A similar reasoning applies when the market of the big country is larger enough compared to the one of
the small country.
13from countries to the MNE, or vice versa.27. This eﬃciency-enhancing role of tax competition
is instead possible when the domestic incumbent is a private ﬁrm (Bjorvatn and Eckel, 2006,
Proposition 5). As a consequence, whenever the location advantage is not too diﬀerent between
the two countries and a tax is paid in equilibrium, the welfare of the region (the sum of the
two countries’ welfare) can increase only if the domestic ﬁrm is private (Bjorvatn and Eckel,
2006, Proposition 6). If the domestic ﬁrm is public then tax competition is always wasteful
from the perspective of the regional welfare as highlighted by Corollary 1 in the present paper.
4 A more general framework
In the present Section we explore the eﬀects of policy competition for FDI in a more general
framework. Consider a general individual demand function Q(p) decreasing and twice con-
tinuously diﬀerentiable so that QA = Q(pA) and QB = nQ(pB). Deﬁne the inverse demand
functions pA (QA) = Q−1
A (.) and pB (QB) = Q−1
B (.). In the following Proposition we extend
the result of Proposition 1 to a more general framework.
Proposition 3 Consider a general decreasing individual demand Q(p). In the presence of a
welfare maximizing public ﬁrm located in country B, both countries always beneﬁts from FDI.
Proof. Whatever the demand, consumers in Country A prefer a monopolist with lower
marginal cost; therefore welfare in country A is higher when the MNE locates within its
borders. To see whether the welfare of country B is higher when FDI occurs within its
borders rather than in country A it is enough to check the net eﬀect of an increase in the
quantity produced by the MNE. In fact, if the MNE invests in country B, its cost of serving
the local consumers is lower and its best response to any quantity produced by the public
incumbent is larger than in the case of FDI in country A. Therefore the equilibrium quantity
sold by the MNE in country B increases if FDI occurs in country B rather than in country
A.28 We have to consider the equilibrium change in welfare of country B taking into account
the optimization behaviour of the public ﬁrm. To this end we deﬁne VB (q1) = WB (r0 (q1);q1)
the value function of the welfare maximization problem of the public ﬁrm. The eﬀect of a















27Therefore, in the presence of any transaction cost, policy competition results in a pure waste of resources
since aggregate welfare would be reduced.
28However, as Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006) show in their paper, this is not enough to say that welfare increases
since there is a trade oﬀ between consumer surplus and the proﬁt of the incumbent and there are cases in which
the loss in proﬁt is larger than the increase in consumer surplus. While their analysis is carried out considering
a proﬁt-maximizer private incumbent, our analysis consider the case of a welfare-maximizer public ﬁrm.







B (.)q1 > 0 always.
Since the eﬀect of a marginal change in q1 is positive, it follows that a discrete increase of q1
always increases the welfare of country B. This completes the proof.
The irrelevance result of Proposition 2 can be generalized to include any positive and
increasing cost function.
Proposition 4 Consider a cost function C0 (q0) positive, increasing and twice continuously
diﬀerentiable, and a linear demand. In the presence of a public welfare-maximizing incumbent
in the large market the introduction of policy competition does not change the investment
choice of the multinational enterprise.
Proof. As discussed in the proof of Proposition 2, this irrelevance result rests on the absence
of strategic interaction between the two ﬁrms. In fact, as long as the public ﬁrm does not
react to changes in the output of the rival ﬁrm (that is, its reaction function is ﬂat), the
MNE behaves as a monopolist on the constant residual demand on the large market and the
introduction of policy competition does not change the investment choice of the MNE. Making
use of the theory of supermodular games, when the objective function is twice continuously
diﬀerentiable, the slope of the reaction function has the same sign as the second cross-derivative
of the objective function. As the demand function is linear, the objective function of the public
ﬁrm is welfare as deﬁned by equation (1), and
∂2W(q0,q1)
∂q0∂q1 = p′′(.) = 0. So the reaction function
of the public incumbent is ﬂat and the ﬁrm always produces the same quantity. This quantity
depends on the cost structure of the ﬁrm and solves the equation:
a − bq0 = C′
0 (q0) (9)
As C0 (q0) is assumed to be increasing, equation (9) has always a solution that is independent
of the quantity choice of the MNE.
5 Other Issues
In this Section, we discuss the robustness of our results to some speciﬁc issues in order to
understand to what extent our conclusions depend on the details of the model. The good
news is that several assumptions could be relaxed without qualitatively changing our main
ﬁndings.
The public ﬁrm exports
In the model presented in Section 2 we have assumed that the public ﬁrm does not export
to country A. if we remove this assumption the relevance of the nature (public or private) of
the ﬁrm for the outcome of the policy competition for FDI becomes even more evident.
15First of all, since its objective function is to maximize the welfare of country B, the public
ﬁrm will behave as a proﬁt maximizer on the market of country A. As a consequence, the
result of Proposition 1 that not only country A, but also country B always beneﬁt from FDI
is reinforced. Now country B enjoys not only a larger consumer surplus but also an increase
in the proﬁts that the public ﬁrm earns on the market of country A. In fact, when locating
in country B, the MNE is a weaker competitor on the market of country A.
This result has also consequences on the equilibrium outcome of the policy competition.
When the public ﬁrm exports to country A the willingness of the government of country B to
subsidize the MNE increases because the welfare gain from FDI increases as explained above.
In addition, the maximum subsidy the government of country A is willing to oﬀer decreases
because the presence of another ﬁrm reduces the beneﬁt of the location of the MNE within
its borders.Therefore the overall eﬀect is summarized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 5 In the presence of a welfare-maximizing public ﬁrm which does export to the
small country, tax/subsidy competition increases the attractiveness of the big country.
Proposition 5 sharply contrasts with the ﬁnding by Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006) according
to which policy competition increases the attractiveness of the small country. They highlight
the fact that, in the presence of a private incumbent, there is a trade-oﬀ between consumer
surplus and proﬁts that decreases the willingness of the big country to subsidize the MNE.
This result emphasizes the relevance of the nature of the incumbent ﬁrm for the outcome of
the policy competition for FDI. It may also cast light on the diﬀerent incentives to deviate
from tax agreements and start a subsidy competition for big a small countries. While small
countries may beneﬁt form policy competition in the presence of foreign private incumbents,
the big country would prefer policy competition only when the incumbent is its own public
ﬁrm.
Arbitrage
In our model, we have implicitly left out the possibility that consumers - or other economic
agents - take advantage of arbitrage opportunities when the diﬀerence in prices between the
two markets exceeds the trade cost. This assumption would well represent markets, such as
utilities and the like, where it is not possible to buy the ﬁnal good or service in a country
and sell it to the other country. However, if arbitrage were possible, instead, ﬁrms would be
constrained in their output choices since any consumer price should not be higher than the
other price plus the trade cost.
In the presence of a welfare-maximizing and relatively ineﬃcient public ﬁrm in country B,
it is easy to show that arbitrage can be proﬁtable just when the consumer price in country
A exceeds that in country B. The arbitrage constraint could thus be binding on country A’s
market only. A ﬁrst eﬀect is that the public ﬁrm would never ﬁnd it proﬁtable to export to
the small country. Since pB ≤ c0 always holds and pA ≤ pB + τ because of the arbitrage con-
straint, the consumer price in country A is always smaller (or at most equal) to the marginal
cost for the public ﬁrm of producing and supplying the good to country A’s consumers, i.e.,
16pA ≤ c0 + τ. Hence, the public ﬁrm would never export the ﬁnal good to the small country
market and our irrelevance result in Proposition 2 would hold true without the unnecessary
assumption of no export for the public incumbent. A second eﬀect of the arbitrage constraint
is the increase in the relative proﬁtability for the MNE of investing in country A. Everything
else equal, by locating its production plant in A, the MNE relaxes the arbitrage constraint on
pA. This is because when FDI goes to A, the price in country B’s market is higher than in the
case of FDI to B, and this, in turn, loosens the pressure exerted by the possibility of arbitrage
on the price in country A. As a result, the attractiveness of country A increases despite the
fact that the arbitrage constraint might negatively aﬀect the proﬁts the foreign ﬁrm realizes
on the small country market.
Budget balance constraint
Another assumption that one can call into question is the absence of a budget constraint,
i.e., a break even condition, in the public ﬁrm’s welfare maximization problem. Indeed, we have
assumed that country B’s government can impose lump-sum taxes on domestic consumers to
subsidize public ﬁrm’s production in the same way as it subsidizes the MNE to attract FDI.
In reality, however, public ﬁrms may be required to balance their budget in order to avoid the
use of distortionary taxation to cover their deﬁcit. If we introduce such a break even condition
for the public ﬁrm, its maximization problem turns out to be equivalent to a problem where
the public ﬁrm’s objective function is a weighted average of welfare and proﬁts. Indeed, if
country B’s government instructs the public ﬁrm to maximize welfare subject to a budget
balance requirement, the ﬁrm’s problem can be written as
max
{q0A,q0B}
WB = CSB ( ) + Π0 ( )
s.t. Π0 ( ) = π0A + π0B ≥ 0
where π0A ≥ 0 and π0B ≤ 0 represent the proﬁts the public ﬁrm earns in country A and the
losses it may have to face in country B, respectively. Denoting by λ the Lagrange multiplier
for the constraint of this problem, the corresponding Lagrangian function is
L = CSB + π0A + π0B + λ(π0A + π0B)
and the complementary slackness condition is given by
λ(π0A + π0B) = 0, λ ≥ 0.







(π0A + π0B) = (1 − θ)WB + θ(π0A + π0B)
with




17As a consequence, the behavior of the public ﬁrm is somehow halfway between an uncon-
strained welfare-maximizer and a proﬁt-maximizer ﬁrm. In particular, when the proﬁts the
ﬁrm realizes by serving the small market are large enough to cover the losses on its domestic
market, i.e., π0A + π0B > 0, the constraint is not binding (θ = 0) and the ﬁrm behaves as in
our original set-up. Otherwise, when it is binding, the constraint makes the public ﬁrm a less
ﬁerce competitor for the MNE, thereby increasing the attractiveness of country B.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have highlighted the relevance of the nature of the incumbent ﬁrm for the
outcome of the competition for FDI between two countries of (possible) asymmetric size. We
have shown that when the incumbent in the big market is a public rather than a private
ﬁrm, both countries always beneﬁt from receiving the investment of the MNE. In particular,
diﬀerently from Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006), when the MNE locates in the big country, the
gain in consumer surplus of domestic residents is always greater than the loss in proﬁts for the
domestic ﬁrm. Hence, both governments are always ready to oﬀer a subsidy to attract FDI.
However, when the public ﬁrm does not export to the small country, tax/subsidy competition
turns out to be irrelevant to the investment decision of the foreign ﬁrm. The consequence is
that policy competition is wasteful for the region and the MNE is the only beneﬁciary of it.
Moreover, contrary to Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006), the location choice of the MNE is always
Pareto eﬃcient and there is no need to introduce policy competition to increase eﬃciency.
When the public ﬁrm exports to the small country, policy competition increases the at-
tractiveness of the big country. In this case, indeed, there is an extra-beneﬁt from receiving
FDI for the big country because the public ﬁrm will have to face a weaker competitor on the
small market.
To sum up, the result provided by Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006) according to which policy
competition may be beneﬁcial because induces an eﬃciency location choice is not general and
it is sensible to the particular features of the market. The present paper provides evidence
that the nature – public or private – o the ﬁrm matters and if the incumbent is a welfare
maximizing ﬁrm the beneﬁt of the introduction of tax/subsidy competition between countries
disappears.
Appendix
Equilibrium of the policy-competition-for-FDI game
The policy-competition-for-FDI game is equivalent to a Bertrand-competition game in prices
between countries A and B and it is characterized by a multiplicity of equilibria. Denoting
by j the country that receives FDI by the foreign ﬁrm and by k the other country (j,k =





















and the proof is a straightforward application of the Bertrand-competition solution.
Suppose that condition (7) holds, so that for country j to win the competition for FDI, it
has to pay a positive subsidy to the foreign ﬁrm. If this is the case, the equilibrium strategy
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is a best reply to country j’s equilibrium strategy since
k’s payoﬀ is always nil. Indeed, it can never attract the foreign investor even by oﬀering
its maximum subsidy. For country j, any other bid S′






is not an equilibrium
strategy since country k will have the opportunity of attracting FDI by oﬀering the foreign ﬁrm
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because it leaves some extra-money on the table, i.e., to the
foreign ﬁrm.
Suppose instead that condition (8) holds, so that the proﬁt gain from investing in country
j is so large that country j can win the competition for FDI by levying a positive lump-sum
tax on the foreign ﬁrm’s proﬁts in spite of the fact that country k oﬀers its maximum subsidy.
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since k’s payoﬀ is always nil. For country j, any other bid T′







equilibrium strategy since country k will have the opportunity of attracting FDI by oﬀering
the foreign ﬁrm Smax









. By contrast, any other bid
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because it leaves money to the foreign ﬁrm.
Proof of Proposition 1. If the MNE invests in country B, its production for that
market is larger than in case of FDI in A. Since the public ﬁrm’s output for country B’s
market is ﬁxed, the MNE’s larger quantity fully translates into an increase in total output
which lowers price, and country B’s welfare is larger because:
(i) consumers beneﬁt from the lower price on the total quantity that is produced if the
MNE invests in A; hence, given that the loss in public ﬁrm’s proﬁts simply represents
a neutral transfer to consumers, there is a net gain in welfare due to the lower price for
the MNE’s quantity;
19(ii) consumers also beneﬁt from the larger quantity produced by the MNE.
Proof of Proposition 2. To show this result we rely on the properties of a monopoly
with linear cost and demand. In fact, when the public ﬁrm does not export to country A,
there is no strategic interaction between ﬁrms since the MNE enjoys monopoly power on the
small market and serves as a monopolist the constant residual demand on the big market.
The residual demand in B is given by:
QResB = n(1 − pB) − n(1 − c0) = n(c0 − pB) =⇒ pB = c0 −
QResB
n
Absent tax/subsidy competition, if the MNE is indiﬀerent between A and B, the gain in
local proﬁts from FDI to A is equal to the gain in local proﬁts from investing in B. In the
presence of tax/subsidy competition, instead, the indiﬀerence condition is given by (7) holding
with equality.
Since the public ﬁrm always produces the same quantity in B, any change in its own
proﬁts is a neutral transfer to consumers. Then, any change in welfare due to the investment









ResB stands for the consumer surplus on the residual demand in country B’s market
when the MNE invests in country j = A,B. So, from (7), the indiﬀerence condition with





















, ∀j,k = {A,ResB}, j  = k
Consider now a monopoly market with linear (inverse) demand, p = a − bq and cost,
C(q) = cq, so that the equilibrium quantity and price are q∗ = a−c
2b and p∗ = a+c
2 . We
analyze the change in consumer surplus and proﬁts due to a change in c by assuming that
marginal costs fall to zero. The new equilibrium quantity and price are q∗∗ = a
2b and p∗∗ = a
2,
respectively.
The change in consumer surplus has two components:
(i) the eﬀect of the reduction in price on the initial quantity
∆1CS = (p∗ − p∗∗)q∗ =
c(a − c)
4b









20Similarly, we can deﬁne two components of the change in proﬁts:
(i) the increase in proﬁts on the initial quantity






(ii) the proﬁts on the quantity increase
∆2π = (q∗ − q∗∗)p∗∗ =
ca
4b
and it is immediate to check that the following relations hold:




In order to apply this result to our framework, let c = τ, a = 1 and b = 1 for country A’s
market, and a = c0 and b = 1
n for country B’s market residual demand.
Proof of Corollary 2. When the MNE chooses to invest in, say, country A in the
absence of policy competition, it must be that ΠA > ΠB. The irrelevance result stated in
Proposition 2 further suggests that
ΠA + Smax
A > ΠB + Smax







B . Therefore, if we follow Bjorvatn and Eckel
(2006) and deﬁne aggregate welfare as the sum of the two countries’ welfare and the MNE’s
proﬁts, it is straightforward to obtain
WA
A + WA
B + ΠA > WB
A + WB
B + ΠB ⇐⇒ ΠA > ΠB
which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5. When the MNE invests in country B rather than in country
A, it becomes a weaker competitor on the small market and the public ﬁrm always enjoys
larger proﬁts there. Thus, country B can oﬀer a subsidy which enhances its attractiveness












where the RHS of (11) is larger than in (10) and bigger than its LHS when ΠA > ΠB.
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